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1. INTRODUCTION
On May 13, 1993, the American Law Institute approved the Proposed Final
Draft of the Complex Litigation Project,' and proposed it to the United States
Congress for enactment. The Proposed Final Draft is the culmination of eight
years of work2 under the able stewardship of Professors Arthur R. Mille and
Mary Kay Kane4 as Reporter and Associate Reporter, respectively. It is perhaps
the most innovative, resourceful, and ambitious work ever undertaken in the
United States on the subject of multistate complex litigation. It establishes new
mechanisms and standards for the intra-federal, state-to-federal, federal-to-state,
and state-to-state transfer and consolidation of related, yet geographically
dispersed, actions, and provides a set of choice-of-law rules for actions that are
transferred to a federal court.
This Symposium is intended to begin the national debate that should precede
and inform Congress' consideration of the Proposed Final Draft. Even if
Congress does not enact it, the Proposed Final Draft will undoubtedly influence
I. American Law Institute, Complex Litigation Project. Proposed Final Draft (May 13, 1993),
[hereinafter Proposed Final Draft]. The Proposed Final Draft is reproduced in an Appendix. infra.
2. Preliminary work began in 1985 with a Preliminary Study on Complex Litigation by
Professor Arthur R. Miller, which was discussed by the Institute's Council and membership in 1986
and 1987, respectively. The Reporters and the Advisory Committee were appointed in 1988. The
First Tentative Draft was discussed by the Institute's membership in May 1989. the Second Tentative
Draft in 1990, the Third Tentative Draft in 1992. and the Proposed Final Draft in 1993.
3. Professor Miller is the Bntce Bromley Professor of Law at the Harvard Law School.
4. Professor Kane is the Dean and Professor of Law at the University of California, Hastings
College of Law. She was primarily responsible for Chapter 6 of the Proposed Final Draft dealing
with choice of law.
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judicial opinion for many years to come. It is hoped that this debate will be
helpful to the judicial application of the Proposed Final Draft.
For reasons that may not be readily apparent to the non-Louisiana reader,
Louisiana is the appropriate place for this debate to begin. As the only state of
the United States that has a long tradition of codified law, including a recent
codification of conflicts law,' Louisiana seems a logical forum for debating the
need for-or form and content of-legislative intervention in the judicial
handling of multistate complex litigation. By recommending this project to
Congress, the American Law Institute subscribes to the premise that, although
commendable and perhaps heroic, judicial efforts to tackle the increasingly
nightmarish problems of multistate complex litigation, are in urgent need of
legislative assistance or other guidance in the form of pre-formulated rules. A
casual survey of judicial decisions in mass disaster cases offers ample evidence
to sustain this premise; indeed, courts routinely invite legislative intervention.6
Although some critics question this premise, most disagreements center on the
extent or form of legislative intervention. This Symposium offers samples of
both types of critiques and offers perspectives, not only from the academic
world, but also from the bench and the bar.
II. THE PROJECT: AN OVERVIEW
One of the duties of a symposium host is to provide appropriate background
and offer a balanced perspective of the symposium's subject. This usually means
that the host's contribution must be descriptive and neutral. This contribution
promises to be both, and no more. Because the articles of this Symposium focus
on only certain parts of the Proposed Final Draft, a brief description of the entire
Proposed Final Draft might be useful to readers not familiar with it. Obviously,
such a description is not a substitute for a reading of the Proposed Final Draft's
text 7 and, especially, of the exceptionally erudite explanatory Comments and
Notes written by the two Reporters.
The Proposed Final Draft consists of six chapters. The first two chapters
define complex litigation and the need for and scope of the project. Complex
litigation is defined as "multiparty, multiforum litigation ... characterized by
5. The new codification went into effect on January 1, 1992. adding a fourth book to the
Louisiana Civil Code of 1870. This codification is discussed, inter aliA, in Symeon C. Symeonides.
Private International Law Codification in a Mixed Jurisdiction: The Louisiana Experience, 57
Rabels Zeitschrift fiir aLislandisches und internationales Privatrecht. 460 (1993); Symeon C.
Symeonides, Les 8rands probibnes de droit international privi et la nouvelle codification de
Louisiane. 81 Revue critique du droit international privd 223, 233-81 (1992); Symeon C. Symeonides,
Louisiana's New Law of Choice of Law for Tort Conflicts: An Exegesis. 66 Tul. L. Rev. 677 (1992)
[hereinafter cited as Symeonides, Exegesis]. Symeon C. Symeonides. La Nuova Normativa della
Louisiana sul Diritto hiternazionale Privato in Tema di Responsabilitd Extraconvrattuale, 29 Rivista
di Diritto Internazionale Privato e Processuale 43 (1993).
6. See infra at text accompanying note 73.
7. See infra. Appendix.
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related claims dispersed in several forums and often involving events that
occurred over long periods of time. '' Examples given range from single mass
disasters that give rise to multiple individual claims accruing at the same time,
9
to multiple-event disasters"° in which myriad claims, latent for generations,
mature at different times." These cases share two basic characteristics: "they
all involve the potential for relitigation of identical or nearly identical issues, and
consequently, they all involve the enormous expenditure of resources."' 2 The
8. Proposed Final Draft, supra note I, Ch. 2, cmt. a, at 9.
9. For instance, an airplane crash or the collapse of a Hyatt Hotel skywalk are single mass
disasters. In addition to the authorities cited in the Reporter's Comments and Notes. in-depth
discussions of the problems encountered in mass-disaster cases can be found in the following recent
articles: Friedrich K. Juenger, Mass Disasters and tie Coifict of Laws. 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. 105
(1989); Robert W. Kastenmeier & Charles G. Geyh, The Case in Support of Legislation Facilitating
the Consolidation of Mass-Accident Litigation: A View froin the Legislature, 73 Marq. L. Rev. 535
(1990); Ralph 1. Lancaster & Catherine R. Connors, Creation of a National Disaster Court: A
Response to "Judicial Federalism in Action." 78 Va. L. Rev. 1753 (1992); Andreas F. Lowenfeld,
Mas Torts and the Conflict of Laws: The Airline Disaster, 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. 157 (1989); Linda
S. Mullenix, Federalizing Choice of Law for Mass.Tort Litigation. 70 Tex. L. Rev. 1623 (1992);
Scott R. Paulsen, Choice of The Punitive Damage Law in Airline Accidents: The Chicago Rule
Comes Crashing Down, 15 J. Corp. L. 803 (1990); Thomas M. Reavley & Jerome W. Wesevich, An
Old Rule for New Reasons: Place of Injury as a Federal Solution to Choice of Law in Single.
Accident Mass.Tort Cases. 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1992). David Rosenberg, Of End Games and Openings
in Mass Tort Cases: Lessons from a Special Master, 69 B.U. L. Rev. 695 (1989); Robert A. Sedler
& Aaron D. Twerski, The Case Against All-Encompassing Federal Mass Tort Legislation: Sacrifice
Without Gain, 73 Marq. L. Rev. 76 (1989); Louise Weinberg, Mass Torts at the Neutral Forum: A
Critical Analysis of the AL 's Proposed Choice Rule. 56 AIb. L. Rev. 807 (1993); Jack B. Weinstein
& Eileen B. Hcrshenov, The Effect of Equity on Mass Tort Law, 1991 U. Ill. L. Rev. 269 (1991);
Russell J. Weintraub, Methods for Resolving Conflict-of-Laws Problems in Mass Tort Litigation, 1989
U. Ill. L. Rev. 129 (1989).
10. For instance, the DES products liability cases or cases involving asbestos, agent orange, or
other toxic substances are multiple-event disasters. In addition to the authorities cited in the
Reporter's Comments, the following recent articles contain extensive discussions of these cases:
Arthur R. Miller & Price Ainsworth, Resolving the Asbestos Personal-Injury Litigation Crisis, 10
Rev. Litig. 419 (1991); Troyen A. Brennan, Environmental Torts. 46 Vand. L. Rev. 1 (1993); Valle
Simms Dutcher, The Asbestos Dragon: The Ramifications of Creative Judicial Management of
Asbestos Cases, 10 Pace Envil. L. Rev. 955 (1993); Jeffrey M. Eilender, Forum Non Conveniens and
Comprehensive Hazardous Waste Coverage Suits, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1066 (1990); Linda S.
Mullenix, Beyond Consolidation: Postaggregative Procedure in Asbestos Mass Tort Litigation, 32
Win. & Mary L. Rev. 475 (1991); Peter H. Schuck. The Worst Should Go First: Deferral Registries
in Asbestos Litigation, 15 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 541 (1992); Jack B. Weinstein, Procedural and
Substantive Problems in Cotplex Litigatio Arising from Disasters, 5 Touro L. Rev. 1 (1988).
11. Proposed Final Draft, supra note I, Ch. 2, cmt. a, at 9.
12. lIt For pertinent discussion and authorities, see id. For recent discussions of the
proceduml problems of complex litigations, see Edward Brunet, The Triumph of Efficiency and
Discretion Over Competing Complex Litigation Policies, 10 Rev. Litig. 273 (1991); Mary Kay Kane,
Dispute Resolution in the United States: Concerns and Opportunities in an Era of Globalization of
Securities Markets, 14 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 405 (1991); Mary Kay Kane, Drafting Choice
of Law Rules for Complex Litigation: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 10 Rev. Litig. 309 (1991)
[hereinafter Drafting Choice of Law Rules]; Linda S. Mullenix, Complex Litigation Reform and
Article Ill Jurisdiction. 59 Fordham L. Rev. 169 (1990); Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist. Seen
[Vol. 54
19941 SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES
scope of the Proposed Final Draft is expressly limited to "judicial dispute
resolution and matters of procedure"' 3 and does not extend to matters of
substantive law, case-management problems, jurisdiction, and the right to trial by
jury. 4
The Proposed Final Draft deliberately refrains from defining in quantitative
terms the cases that fall within its intended scope.' s Rather, the decision of
which cases will be subject to consolidated treatment under the Proposed Final
Draft is relegated to the Complex Litigation Panel, a panel of federal judges that
will replace the existing Multidistrict Litigation Panel, and will be guided by
criteria provided by the Proposed Final Draft, 6 as well as by the experience
accumulated by its predecessor panel. A proposal to confine the Proposed Final
Draft's scope to "mega-mass cases" and to define them in terms of a minimum
number of parties and amounts in dispute" was not adopted by the Institute's
membership."s It was agreed, however, that appropriate language be inserted
in a Glass Darkly: The Future of the Federal Courts, 1993 Wis. L. Rev. I (1993); Judith Resnik.
From "Cases" to "Litigation," 54 Law & Contemp. Probs. 5 (1991); Thomas D. Rowe. Jr..
Jurisdictional and Transfer Proposals for Complex Litigation. 10 Rev. Litig. 325 (1991): Thomas
D. Rowe, Jr. & Kenneth D. Sibley, Beyond Diversity: Federal Multiparty. Multiforum Jurisdiction,
135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 7 (1986): William W. Schwarzer et al., Judicial Federalism in Action:
Coordination of Litigation in State and Federal Courts, 78 Va. L. Rev. 1689 (1992); Edward F.
Sherman, Aggregate Disposition of Related Cases: The Policy Issue, 10 Rev. Litig. 231 (1991);
Linda J. Silberman, Judicial Adjuncts Revisited. The Proliferation af Ad Hoc Procedure. 137 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 2131 (1989); Marjorie A. Silver. Giving Notice: An Argument for Notification of Putative
Plaintiffs in Complex Litigation, 66 Wash. L. Rev. 775 (1991); Michael E. Solimine, Removal,
Remands. and Reforming Federal Appellate Review. 58 Mo. L. Rev. 287 (1993): Louise E. Teitz,
Taking Multiple Bites of the Apple: A Proposal to Resolhe Conflicts of Jurisdiction and Multiple
Proceedings, 26 Int'l Law. 21 (1992); Jay Tidmarsh. Unattainable Justice: The Form of Complex
Litigation and the Limits of Judicial Power. 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1683 (1992); Spencer W. Waller,
A Unified Theory of Transnational Procedure, 26 Cornell Int'l L.J. 101 (1993); Jack B. Weinstein,
After Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the Barriers to Justice Being Raised?.
137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1901 (1989).
13. Proposed Final Draft, supra note I, Ch. 1, cmt. b, at 3.
14. Id. at 3-7. For a discussion of these and other subjects excluded from the Proposed Final
Draft's scope, see Linda S. Mullenix, Unfinished Symphono,: The Complex Litigation Project Rests,
54 La. L. Rev. 977 (1994).
15. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note I, § 3.01, cmt. d, at 66 ("The use of exact
dimensional criteria has been rejected ... because consolidation may be desirable even when
relatively few cases are involved."). See also Professor Miller's statements on this subject in
American Law Institute. Proceedings of the 1993 Annual Meeting. May 13. 1993, Washington D.C..
Afternoon Session 9-10, 11-12 (hereinafter referred to as Proceedings]. This is an unedited version
of the Proceedings made available to the Review. All references to pages are references to this
unedited version.
16. See Proposed Final Draft. supra note I, § 3.01. described infra.
17. This proposal was made by Judge Jack B. Weinstein during the final discussion of the
Project by the membership of the American Law Institute on May 13, 1993. By way of illustration,
Judge Weinstein suggested a minimum of 5,000 parties and an amount in controversy exceeding S 100
million. See Proceedings. supra note 15, at 9.
18. See id.
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in the preamble of the bill to be submitted to Congress, "emphasizing that [the
Proposed Final Draft's] normal expected operation would be limited to mass tort
and similar situations."' 9
A. Procedural Aspects-Chapters 3-5
1. Intra-Federal Transfer and Consolidation
Chapter 3 of the Proposed Final Draft establishes criteria and mechanisms
for intra-federal transfer and consolidation of cases. The chapter builds on the
existing multidistrict litigation statute'0 and the practices that have evolved
under it. The existing Multidistrict Litigation Panel is to be replaced with a
similar panel, the Complex Litigation Panel, 2' which will decide whether cases
should be consolidated for trial 2  and where they should be tried.
23
Actions are candidates for transfer and consolidation if they involve one or
more common questions of fact,24 and if, in the panel's judgment, consolldation
will "promote the just, efficient, and fair conduct of the actions."25 In reaching
its decision, the panel is instructed to consider two groups of factors, both of
which must be satisfied. The first group encompasses considerations of systemic
efficiency: the extent to which transfer and consolidation will reduce duplicative
litigation, the likelihood of inconsistent adjudications if consolidation is not
ordered, the relative cost of litigation in individual versus consolidated treatment,
and the relative burden on the judicial system. 26 The second group encompass-
es factors of fairness and convenience: whether the transfer and consolidation
can be accomplished in a way that is fair to the parties and does not result in
undue inconvenience to them or the witnesses.2 7 In considering these factors,
the panel is instructed to consider a number of "matters," such as: the number
of parties and actions involved, the geographic dispersion of the actions, the
subject matter and amount in dispute, the existence and significance of local
concerns, the significance and number of common issues, and the wishes of the
parties."
19. Id. at 12.
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988).
21. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note I, § 3.02.
22. See id. § 3.01.
23. See id. § 3.04 (providing that cases may be transferred to "any district court in which the
just and efficient resolution of the actions will be promoted and fairness to the individual litigants
can be facilitated").
24. This test of "minimal commonality" is a much lower standard than the one required for
consolidation under present law. See id. § 3.01. cmt. c, at 53.
25. Id. § 3.01(a).
26. Id. § 3.01(b)(1).
27. Id. § 3.01(b)(2).
28. Id. § 3.01(b)(2), a-i.
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Once the cases are transferred, the transferee court is empowered to organize
them, using recognized bifurcation techniques, to order the trial of common and
individual issues, or to retain some of them and remand the rest to the transferor
court.29 Finally, Section 3.08 contemplates the enactment of a federal statute
that would authorize the transferee court to exercise nationwide jurisdiction over
all parties to the transferred actions "to the full extent of the power conferrable
on a federal court under the United States Constitution."
30
2. State-to-Federal Removal and Consolidation
Chapter 5 establishes standards and mechanisms for the removal of actions
filed in state courts to a designated federal court for consolidated treatment with
actions already filed in that court and other federal courts. State actions are
candidates for removal if they (I) arise from the same transaction, occurrence,
or series of transactions or occurrences as an action pending in the federal court
and (2) share a common question of fact with that action.3' In deciding
whether to order removal, the Complex Litigation Panel is instructed to evaluate
the same factors as those provided by Section 3.01 for intra-federal transfers,
and, in addition, to consider "whether removal [from the state court] will unduly
disrupt or impinge upon state court or regulatory proceedings." 2 Furthermore,
unlike federal-to-federal and federal-to-state transfers, the state-to-federal
removals may be blocked by the objection of all parties to the state actions and
the appropriate state judge.33
3. Federal-to-State Transfer and Consolidation
Chapter 4 completes the circle by providing for federal-to-state and state-to-
state transfer and consolidation of actions originally filed in diverse federal and
state courts, respectively. Obviously, this is nothing short of revolutionary.
Section 4.01 provides that, in certain circumstances narrowly defined therein,
actions filed in federal court34 may be transferred to a designated state court for
consolidated treatment with other cases pending there. The transfer will be
ordered by the Complex Litigation Panel, that is, the same panel of federal
judges that decides intra-federal transfers or removals. The transfer will be
29. See id. § 3.06.
30. Id. § 3.08(a).
31. See id. § 5.01(a). In addition, § 5.03. which builds on the existing law of supplemental and
pendent jurisdiction, grants the transferee court the power to assert subject matter jurisdiction over
claims that may lack independent subject matter jurisdiction but are logically related to claims
removed or transferred to that court under § 5.01 or § 3.01, respectively.
32. Id. § 5.01(a).
33. See id. § 5.01(b).
34. Certain actions, such as actions that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
courts, are exempted from this transfer. See id. § 4.01(c).
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ordered (1) if the events giving rise to the controversy are "centered in a single
state and a significant portion of the existing litigation is lodged in the courts of
that state" 31 and (2) the panel determines that "fairness to the parties and tile
interest of justice will be materially advanced"'  by the transfer and that the
transferee court is "superior to other possible transferee courts." 37 In reaching
its decision, the panel is instructed to consider the same factors used to evaluate
intra-federal transfers and, in addition, to compare the relative number of cases
pending in state and federal courts and the number of states in which the state
and federal cases are located.3
The panel is also instructed to consider "whether the ... law to be applied
in the state transferee court differ[s] from that which would have been applied
by a federal transferee court, to a sufficient degree39 so that the transfer would
risk prejudicing the parties transferred. This consideration is necessary because
these transfers, unlike intra-federal or state-to-federal transfers, will not be
governed by the choice-of-law rules provided for federal courts in Section 6 of
the Proposed Final Draft.' Instead, the choice-of-law rules of the transferee
state court will control.4'
Unlike intra-federal transfers or cases removed from state to federal court
under Section 5.01. the federal-to-state transfers are subject to a veto by the
judicial authorities of the transferee state.4" Such consent is necessary to
accommodate basic federalism concerns. However, unlike state-to-federal
removals which can be blocked by a unanimous objection of the parties, the
federal-to-state transfers do not depend on the parties' wishes. A proposal to
make such transfers dependent on party consent was rejected by the Institute
membership.43
Once the transfer is approved, the transferee state court will have the same
case-management powers as a federal transferee court under Section 3.06,
including the nationwide jurisdictional and subpoena powers conferred by Section
35. Id. 5 4.01(a)(1).
36. Id. 5 4.01(a)(2).
37. Id. § 4.01(a)(3). During the final discussion of the Proposed Final Draft, it was suggested
that the word "superior" in the last-quoted phrase be replaced with the words "more appropriate" or
"more suitable." Proceedings. supra note 15, at 17. Earlier. Professor James B. Lewis suggested that
the whole phrase be replaced with language such as "that the interest of justice would be better
served by this designation rather than by an alternative one." Id. at 13. These suggestions were
accepted by the Reporters.
38. Proposed Final Draft, stopra note I. § 4.01(b)(I)-(2).
39. Id. § 4.01(b)(3).
40. See id. §§ 6.01-6.06. All provisions of Chapter 6 apply to "actions consolidated under §
3.01" (i.e.. intra-federal transfers) or actions "removed under § 5.01" (i.e., state-to-federal transfers).
41. See Proceedings, supra note 15. at 13-15. The third option of applying the choice-of-law
rules of the state of the transferor court, as is presently done in intra-federal transfers under Klaxon
Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co.. 313 U.S. 487. 61 S. Ct. 1020 (1941) and Van Dusen v. Barrack. 376
U.S. 612. 84 S. Ct. 805 (1964). is apparently out of the question.
42. See Proposed Final Draft. supra note 1. § 4.01(a).
43. See Proceedings, supra note 15. at 12.
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3.0 8 ." However, appeals from its decisions will be heard by the appellate
courts of the transferee state.
4
4. State-to-State Transfer and Consolidation
Although the proposed mechanisms of Chapter 4 are quite innovative, the
futuristic, albeit hortatory, Section 4.02 envisions an even more revolutionary
regime. Under Section 4.02, actions pending in the courts of different states
could be transferred and consolidated from one state court to another. Such a
regime can come into existence only through an interstate compact or a uniform
act, both of which require the consent of participating or adopting states. A
model for such a compact or uniform act is contained in a "Reporter's Study"
which is appended to the Proposed Final Draft.' In an article published in this
Symposium, Justice Herbert D. Wilkins of the Massachusetts Supreme Court
discusses transfers to and from state courts from the perspective of a state
judge.47
In the meantime, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws has approved and recommended for enactment by all states a similar,
but less ambitious, model dealing with complex and non-complex cases, the
Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act.4 This Act is discussed and compared with
the ALl project by Dean Edward H. Cooper, the Reporter for the Uniform Act,
in an article published in this issue.49
B. Choice of Law-Chapter 6
Finally, Chapter 6 of the Proposed Final Draft provides a uniform set of
choice-of-law rules to be applied by the transferee court in intra-federal or state-
to-federal transfer cases." Since most of the contributions to this Symposium
44. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, § 4.01(a).
45. Id. § 4.01(d).
46. See id. Appendix B.
47. See Herbert D. Wilkins, The American Law Iistitute's Comple.r Litigation Project: A State
Judge's View. 54 La. L. Rev. 1155 (1994) ("As a slate judge. I have no problem with the fact that
the operation of the proposed system will result in cases being taken away from state court
jurisdiction on a standard of freer mobility than that applied in traditional removal cases....
Similarly. I have no difficulty in accepting into the state judicial system those cases which meet the
standard for the panel's transfer of federal and state cases to a state court. These cases in large
measure are cases that could have been commenced in the courts of the transferee state, and the legal
issues are ones to be decided under the law of the transferee state.").
48. This Act is reproduced in Appendix C of the Proposed Final Draft, at 675-16.
49. See Edward H. Cooper. Interstate Consolidation: A Comparison of the AU Project with
the Unifonn Transfer of Litigation Act, 54 La. L. Rev. 897 (1994).
50. All provisions of Chapter 6 apply to "actions consolidated under § 3.01" (i.e., intra-federal
transfers) or actions "removed under 1 5.01" (i.e., state-to-federal transfers). See Proposed Final
Draft, supra note 1, §§ 6.01(a), 6.02(a). 6.03(a), 6.04(a), 6.05(a), 6.06(a).
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focus on this chapter," and most of them are disapproving, a more detailed
description of this chapter may be needed to provide a more balanced perspective
for the reader.
1. Preliminary Considerations
a. Federalizing the Law of Choice of Law: The Power
The existence of a constitutional power to federalize the law of choice of
law should not be doubted, 2 although it has been rarely exercised. 3  This
power can be derived from several federal constitutional clauses, such as the Full
Faith and Credit Clause,' the Commerce Clause,"5 and, at least for federal
courts, the Judicial Power Clause' in combination with the Necessary and
Proper Clause." It is only because Congress has not exercised this power that
choice of law remains a matter of state law under Erie5 8 and Klaxon. 9 To be
sure, that Congress has the power to federalize does not mean that its power
should be exercised or that Congress should enact comprehensive federal
statutory choice-of-law rules. This is a matter of policy choice. At least two of
the contributors to this Symposium strongly oppose such a choice.
60
b. Its Exercise: The Van Dusen Burden
At least in the area of complex litigation, the need for some form of federal
intervention can be readily ascertained by a casual perusal of consolidated cases
51. See Friedrich K. Juenger. The Complex Litigation Project's Tort Choice.of.Law Rules, 54
La. L. Rev. 907 (1994); P. John Kozyris, The Conflicts Provisions of the ALI's Complex Litigation
Project: A Glass Half Full? 54 La. L. Rev. 953 (1994); James R. Nafziger. Choice of Law in Air
Disaster Cases: Complex Litigation Rules and the Comnnion Law, 54 La. L. Rev. 1001 (1994);
Robert A. Sedler, The Complex Litigation Project's Proposal for Federally Mandated Choice of Law
in Mass Torts Cases: Another Assault on State Sovereignty, 54 La. L. Rev. 1085 (1994); David E.
Seidelson, Section 6.01 of the ALI's Complex Litigation Project: Function Follows Forn, 54 La. L.
Rev. I 11 (1994); Gene R. Shreve, Reform Aspirations of the Complex Litigation Project, 54 Lu. L.
Rev. 1139 (1994). For previous discussions, see Kane, Drafting Choice of Law Rules. supra note
12; Mullenix, supra note 9; Donald T. Trautman, Toward Federalizing Choice of Law, 70 Tex. L.
Rev. 1715, 1737.41 (1992); Weinberg. supra note 9.
52. For a contrary view, see Seidelson. supra note 51, at n.2.
53. See. e.8.. 28 U.S.C. § 1738(A) (Supp. 1993) (Federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
of 1980); 42 U.S.C. § 11601 (1993) (Federal International Child Abduction Remedies Act).
54. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1.
55. U.S. Consi. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. In fact, the Commerce Clause can also be the basis for federal
substantive legislation for certain mass ton and mass contract cases. See infra note 74.
56. U.S. Const. art. 111. § 2, cl. I. For a discussion of these clauses. see Proposed Final Draft,
supra note 1. Ch. 6, Intro. Note, cmt. b, at 382-86.
57. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
58. Eric R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938).
59. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487. 61 S. Ct. 1020 (1941).
60. See Seidelson. supra note 51; Sedler. supra note 51.
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decided by federal courts under the present multidistrict litigation statute. Even
in relatively simple cases, such as those involving airplane accidents, the existing
system seems to be very near the crashing point under the combined weight of
Erie, Kaxon, Van Dusen, 61 and Ferens,62 which require a transferee federal
court to apply the choice-of-law rules of the state in which the transferor federal
court is sitting. This problem has been described in detail elsewhere, 3 but the
gravity of this weight can best be measured by the judges who are forced to bear
it. In In Re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974,' Judge Hall was faced with the
unenviable task of having to decide 203 consolidated lawsuits arising from the
death of over three hundred passengers of a Turkish airplane. Describing the
burden of Van Dusen he wrote:
The law on "choice of law" in the various states and in the federal
courts is a veritable jungle, which, if the law can be found out, leads
not to a "rule of action" but a reign of chaos dominated in each case by
the judge's "informed guess" as to what some other state than the one
in which he sits would hold its law to be.... Most of the cases are
involved with such a "guess" as to the law of one other state or perhaps
as many as three. Here... this Court would have to "guess" what the
courts in 24 foreign and 12 domestic jurisdictions would hold on the
facts in this case, including their "choice-of-law" rules, and who knows
what laws of what country or state that would lead to.
65
In a similar case, 1n re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton hIt'l Airport, Denver,
Colo., on Nov. 15, 1987," the parties did their best to relieve the court of some
of the choice-of-law burden by stipulating to the application of the law of each
plaintiff's domicile to the issue of compensatory damages and of the law of the
forum to all other issues. Predictably, the parties could not agree on the law
applicable to punitive damages. Utilizing the most common way of reducing the
Van Dusen burden, the court decided to blur the differences between the choice-
of-law methodologies followed by the transferor courts in New Jersey (interest
analysis) and Idaho and Colorado (Restatement Second) by characterizing the
Restatement approach as merely "a more formalized approach to the interests
considered in [interest analysis]" !67
61. Van Duscn v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 84 S. Ct. 805 (1964).
62. Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516. 110 S. Ct. 1274 (1990).
63. See, e.g., authorities cited supra in notes 9-12, Nafziger, supra note 5 1 P. John Kozyris
& Symeon C. Symeonides. Choice of Low in the American Courts in 1989: An Overview, 38 Am.
J. Comp. L. 601, 607-14 (1990).
64. 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
65. Id. at 739-40.
66. 720 F. Supp. 1433 (D. Coo. 1988).
67. in re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int'l Airport. Denver, Colo., on Nov. 15, 1987, 720
F. Stipp. 1445, 1448 (D. Colo. 1988).
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In In re Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa, on July 19, 1989," the
judge's Van Dusen burden could not be lightened as easily. More than one
hundred lawsuits were filed by plaintiffs from thirty states and two foreign
countries, in eight different states, that were then transferred to the federal district
of Illinois. Of these eight states, only three, Colorado, Iowa, and Illinois, could
be grouped under one choice-of-law methodology, the Restatement Second.6
The court added New York to this group without any explanation, even though
such a grouping is questionable at best. Even more questionable was the court's
classification of Georgia as a Restatement Second state with the explana-
tion/guess that, although "[t]he Supreme Court of Georgia has never decided
whether the Restatement should be applied in air crash cases, . . . Georgia would
adopt the Restatement if the question were raised.0 '7 This was too optimistic
a guess since, as late as 1984, the Georgia Supreme Court had expressly
denounced the center of gravity approach for contract conflicts,7 ' and has been
routinely upholding lower court decisions adhering to the lex loci delicti in tort
conflicts. Georgia continues to adhere to the same position to date."
That able and conscientious judges find it necessary to take such liberties
indicates that the Van Dusen burden is simply unbearable in consolidated
multidistrict mass-disaster litigation. This is further evidenced by the recurring
plea of federal judges for federal conflicts, or substantive, legislation for mass-
disaster cases. Judge Finesilver's plea in the Stapleton case is the latest voice
from the trenches:
"The choice of law problems inherent in air crash and mass disaster
litigation cry out for federal statutory resolution. We urge Congress to
pursue enactment of uniform federal tort law to apply to liability and
damages in the context of commercial airline disasters and other mass
tort's.... Uncertainty on the choice of law question requires a
considerable expenditure of time, money and other resources ... by
litigants and counsel. Federal law would eliminate costly uncertainty
and create uniformity. This approach would lead to a quick and
efficient resolution of mass disaster cases.""
68. 734 F. Supp. 1425 (N.D. II. 1990).
69. Nevertheless, the court lumped together the cases transferred from the District of Columbia,
a jurisdiction following pure interest analysis, with the cases transferred from Pennsylvania, a state
that has shown particular preference for Professor Cavers' "principles of preference." See Symeon
C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1993, 42 Am. J. Comp. L. (forthcoming
1994).
70. Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, 734 F. Supp. at 1434.
71. See General Tel. Co. v. Trimm, 311 S.E.2d 460, 462 (Ga. 1984).
72. See Symeonides. supra note 69.
73. In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int'l Airport. Denver, Colo., on Nov. 15, 1987, 720
F. Supp. 1445. 1454-55 (D. Colo. 1988).
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Chapter 6 of the Proposed Final Draft is the American Law Institute's response
to these pleas.
c. Federal Intervention in Complex Litigation
Federal intervention in the area of complex litigation could take three
different forms: (a) enactment of federal substantive legislation for mass torts
and mass contracts cases under the Commerce Clause; 74 (b) enactment of
federal choice-of-law rules under the Full Faith and Credit Clause; or (c) a mere
overruling of Klaxon-Van Dusen and an express authorization to the federal
courts to develop their own body of federal common law of choice of law."
The first option is generally regarded as utopian, at least for the foreseeable
future.76 The third option has many supporters, including several members of
the American Law Institute." However, their efforts to steer the Institute in
this direction have been unsuccessful. 7' The Institute has chosen the second
option of boldly stepping into the "dismal swamp"' 9 of conflicts law and
74. For citations of authority, see Proposed Final Draft. supra note 1, Ch. 6. Intro. Note, cmt.
b, at 382-85. As Professor Juenger notes,
[Tihe perceived need for a uniform national law is no less pressing in aerial as in aquatic
disasters. Lacking the necessary foresight, the Founding Fathers only provided for
admiralty jurisdiction. One may surmise, however, that ... they would not have been
adverse to including other forms of interstate and international transportation. But even
in the absence of a specific constitutional provision akin to the admiralty clause, it can
hardly be denied that justice in mass disaster cases would be considerably enhanced by
a uniform body of federal law.... [Tlo leave the outcome of complex litigation to the
vagaries of state ... law ... is but a second-best solution.
Juenger, supra note 51, at 920. See also Shreve, supra note 51. at 1139: Michael H. Gottesman,
Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case for Federal Choice of Law Statutes, 80 Geo. L. J. I (1991);
Trautman, supra note 51, at 173 1. Georgene M. Vairo, Multi-Tort Cases: Cause for More Darkness
on the Subject, or a New Federal Common Law?, 54 Fordham L. Rev., 167 (1985).
75. Several attempts to accomplish such a result through an act of Congress have so far been
unsuccessful. The last two attempts are the Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 1989. H.R.
3406, 101st Cong.. Ist Sess. (1989). introduced by former Representative Robert W. Kastenmeier,
and the Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 1991, H.R. 2450, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991). Both bills
passed the House but not the Senate. These efforts are detailed in Sedler, supra note 51. See also
Kastenmeier & Geyh. supra note 9; Charles G. Geyh. Couiplex.Litigation and the Legislative
Process, t0 Rev. Litig. 401 (1991).
76. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1. Ch. 6, Intro. Note. at 375. For an opposing view,
see Juenger, supra note 51.
77. See, e.g.. Juenger, supra note 51: Donald T. Trautman. Some Thoughts on Choice of Law.
Judicial Discretion, and the A LI's Complex Litigation Project. 54 La. L. Rev. 835 (1994); Trautman,
supra note 51.
78. See the discussion of the Trautman motion. Trautman, supra note 77. For the Juenger
motion, see Juenger, supra note 5 t.
79. Since it was used by Dean Prosser more than forty years ago (see William Prosser.
Interstate Publication, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 959, 971 (1953)), the term "dismal swamp" has become the
universally accepted shorthand for describing the complexity and incoherence of American conflicts
law. In 1987. in an article entitled Exploring the "Dismal Swamp": The Revision of Louisiana's
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proposing a comprehensive set of choice-of-law rules to be cast in statutory
form. Chapter 6 of the Proposed Final Draft is premised on the conclusion that
"a federal statutory choice of law code is necessary to foster the fair and efficient
handling of complex litigation"' and that, to "provide sufficient predictability
and avoid conflicting results,"8' to "decrease forum shopping[,] and to reduce
the extremely complicated inquiry now needed to ascertain and apply the
numerous state choice of law rules, 8 a set of "reasonably precise choice of
law rules"8 3 should be devised for these cases.
d. Intervention Through Choice-of-Law Rules
The above conclusion is bound to encounter significant opposition in a
country that lacks any tradition of codification; especially in the field of conflicts
law, which is particularly hostile to legislative interventions and inhospitable to
almost any process of rule making. 4 For too long, American conflicts thinking
has been mesmerized by the teachings of Brainerd Currie who proclaimed that
all rules are necessarily evil.
In attempting to use the rules we encounter difficulties that stem not
from the fact that the particular rules are bad, . . . but rather from the
fact that we have such rules at all .... We would be better off without
choice-of-law rules.85
This agnosticism was a natural but naive overreaction" to the theology of
Joseph Beale and the theocracy of his first Restatement of Conflicts."7 It has
been the great misfortune of American conflicts that the only rule system it ever
had was a spectacularly bad one. The rules of the first Restatement were too
rigid and mechanical, leaving no room for evolution. This rigidity led to the
overuse of the few available escape devices: characterization, ordre public, the
substance versus procedure dichotomy, and, occasionally, renvoi. Gradually, the
Conflicts Law on Successions, 47 La. L. Rev. 1029 (1987), this author described Louisiana's first
attempt to codify its conflicts law and expressed the hope that others might follow. In 1990,
Professor Gottesman used the same terminology in arguing for federal conflicts legislation. See
Gottesman. supra note 74.




84. The reasons for this climate have been discussed elsewhere. See Symeon C. Symeonides,
Exception Clauses in American Conflicts Law, 42 Am. J. Comp. L. 601, 604.08 (1994) thereinafter
Exception Clauses); Symeon C. Symeonides, Revolution and Counter.Revolution in American
Conflicts Low: Is There a Middle Ground?. 46 Ohio St. L. J. 549, 550-52 (1985) [hereinafter
Revolution].
85. Brainerd Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws, 180, 183 (1963).
86. See Symeonides, Revolution, supra note 84, at 550-52.
87. American Law Institute, Restatement of Conflict of Laws (1934).
[Vol. 54
SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES
Restatement came to be honored more in these exceptions than in its rules.
Because of the wide and frequent utilization of these escape devices, the
Restatement was perceived as incapable of producing the legal certainty and
predictability that its drafters had promised. In turn, this failure encouraged and
nourished an open revolution in the early 1960's, at least in the area of tort and
contract conflicts. As with many revolutions, the established system was
demolished rather than repaired. The obvious deficiencies of the Restatement's
rules, coupled with the influence of American Legal Realism, the philosophical
school of choice of most conflicts revolutionaries," provoked an overreaction
against any rules. This prejudice against a priori rules continues to dominate the
conflicts literature.
After thirty years of revolution and a few years of counter-revolution, after
so many years of impressionism juridique and experimentation with various ad
hoc approaches, including the one advanced by Currie, American conflicts law
looks like "a tale of a thousand-and-one-cases"8 9 in which "each case is decided
as if it were unique and of first impression."'  The "dismal swamp" described
by Dean Prosser in 19519' became a "veritable jungle" in the eyes of Judge
Hall in 1975.92 In 1994, it can best be described as a toxic swamp. Plaintiffs'
attorneys, defendants' attorneys, and conflicts teachers alike can make a living
out of this uncertainty as they do with toxic waste cases. But the judges who
handle mass tort cases tell us that the toxic swamp of conflicts law is threatening
to contaminate precious judicial resources urgently needed elsewhere in the
federal system. A set of choice-of-law rules, applicable at least to mass tort and
contract cases, can help conserve these resources and provide a. modicum of
certainty for plaintiffs and defendants alike. Obviously, certainty, efficiency, and
predictability should not be the only goals of a choice-of-law system. They must
be balanced against the need for equity, flexibility, and the protection of justified
party expectations." Through an elaborate combination of rules and escape
mechanisms, Chapter 6 of the Proposed Final Draft is capable of producing this
balance.
2. The Choice-of-Law Approach of Chapter 6
In evaluating a proposed statutory enactment, it is customary for commenta-
tors to pigeonhole its choice-of-law approach into one or another of the existing
88. For the influence of American legal realism on the American conflicts revolution, see
Symeon C. Symeonides, An Outsider's View of the American Approach to Choice of Law 212-25.
229-34 (1980).
89. P. John Kozyris, Interest Analysis Facing its Critics-And, hicidentally, What Should Be
Done About Choice of Law for Products Liabiliy?. 46 Ohio St. L. J. 569, 578 (1985).
90. Id. at 580.
91. See supra note 79.
92. See supra text accompanying note 65.
93. See Symeonides. supra note 88, at 112-30.
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methodological camps and then to praise or attack the proposal accordingly. 4
In the case of Chapter 6 of the Proposed Final Draft, it is tempting to character-
ize the approach followed by it as "interest analysis." After all, the chapter
speaks of "interested" ' states, or states whose policies "would be furthered by
the application of [their] law[s]."96 Similarly, the chapter's reliance on factual
contacts or factors listed in a non-hierarchical, non-exclusive fashion,97 bears
some resemblance to the Restatement Second. Finally, that Chapter 6 contains
rules that permit, or lead to, the application of the law of a state solely because
of its territorial connections to the case98 evokes comparisons with even the first
conflicts Restatement and gives rise to accusations of "Bealism." 99
Such characterizations are plausible but not necessarily accurate or helpful.
For example, while elements of interest analysis are undeniably present in the
chapter, what is completely lacking, and is in fact expressly rejected, is the
forum-favoritism and pro-recovery bias that characterized Currie's version of
interest analysis and many of its judicial applications.'0° Similarly, although
the resemblance to the Second Restatement is equally undeniable, the critical
difference is that Chapter 6 contains explicit choice-of-law rules that go beyond
the mere presumptions of the Second Restatement. Finally, the best response to
the "Bealism" accusation is that, unlike the rules of the First Restatement, every
single one of the rules of Chapter 6 is subject to some exception.' 0'
Thus, it would be more constructive to accept that Chapter 6 has forged its
own individual approach and to evaluate it on its own merits. This approach
draws from, but also builds on, the considerable pool of American academic
doctrine and its judicial applications, but it is sufficiently different from any of
the existing approaches to deserve a separate evaluation without the baggage
carried by any one of them.
94. For a similar experience with the Louisiana codification which is labelled by some as
having adopted the "comparative impairment" approach, see Symeonides, Exegesis, supra note 5, at
689-92.
95. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, §§ 6.01(c), 6.05(b).
96. Id. §§ 6.01(c), 6.03(c), 6.05(b), 6.06(c).
97. See id. §§ 6.01(b), 6.03(b), 6.06(b).
98. See id. §§ 6.01(c)(4) (place of conduct); 6.03(c) (primary place of business of common
contracting party); 6.06(c) (state that has two of the territorial contacts listed therein).
99. See Juenger's critique, supra note 51. See also Seidelson, supra note 51 (proclaiming that
Chapter 6 "consists of a little bit of interest analysis, too much of the Restatement (Second) of
Conflicts, and several seemingly slapdash subsections having no apparent legitimate antecedents").
Given the Reporter's explicit rejection of result-selectivism, the only one of the contemporary
American approaches that the Proposed Final Draft cannot be accused of-or praised for-adopting
is the "better-law" approach. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note I. § 6.01, Reporter's Note 16 to
cmt. c, at 426-27; Ch. 6. Intro. Note, cmt. c. at 387 (stating that "federal choice of law rules should
not be designed with the objective of promoting substantive preferences for one party rather than the
other").
tO0. See Symeonides, Revolutiion, supra note 84, at 566-67.
101. See infra Section 1i(B)(3)(b).
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3. The Desideratum of Applying a Single Law
a. The Objective
One of the purposes of Chapter 6 is to facilitate and promote the application
of a single law to all "similar"'02 claims "being asserted against a defen-
dant"'0° in a mass tort or mass contract case. This desideratum is explicitly
stated in Subsection (a) of Sections 6.01 for torts, and 6.02 and 6.03 for
contracts.'04  It should be noted that, first, this statement applies to each
defendant rather than to the entire litigation.'03 Secondly, this statement should
not be viewed as a proscription of depefage, that is, the application of different
laws to different issues in the same claim.'6 Instead, it should be viewed as
an effort to ensure that, "to the extent feasible,"'0 7 all similar tort claims
against the same defendant and all claims "under the same or similar contracts
with a common party"' 0 should be treated equally. Since the defendant is the
common target of all claimants in mass tort or mass contract cases, the defendant
becomes the central focus of Chapter 6. This is evident not only in the fact that
the single-law objective is built around the defendant, but also in the fact that
many of the specific rules are constructed around factual contacts associated with
the defendant.
b. The Exceptions
In any event, the statement of the single-law objective is not an unqualified
one. Recognizing that in some cases this objective may be non-feasible'09 or
inappropriate,"" the drafters provide the court with at least two escapes.
Subsection (e) of Section 6.01, Subsection (b) of Section 6.02, and Subsection
(d) of Section 6.03 authorize the court to divide the actions into subgroups of
"claims, issues, or parties"'" and allow more than one state's law to be applied
if the court determines that the application of a single state's law to all elements
of the claims pending against a defendant would be inappropriate.
102. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, § 6.01(a) ("similar tort claims"); § 6.03(a) and (d)
("similar contracts with a common party"). The word "similar" implies that Chapter 6 permits the
application of the law of different states to dissimilar claims against the same defendant.
103. Id. § 6.01(a). See also id. § 6.03(a) which speaks of "the objective of applying a single
state's law to every claim being asserted under the same or similar contracts with a common party."
104. For a critique of this notion, see Sedler, supra note 51.
105. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note I. Ch. 6, Intro. Note, cmt. c. at 388.
106. See infra Section It(B)(4).
107. Proposed Final Draft, supra note I, § 6.01(a).
108. Id. § 6.03(a).
109. Id. Section 6.01(a) states the single.law objective is to be pursued "to the extent feasible."
This phrase is not repeated in any of the other sections of Chapter 6.
110. Id. §§ 6.01(e), 6.03(d).
Ill. Id. §§ 6.01(e), 6.02(b), 6.03(d).
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The same provisions provide another partial escape from the choice-of-law
rules of Chapter 6 by authorizing the court to sever and remand to the transferor
courts certain "claims or issues"" 2 that, in the court's opinion, "should (not]
be governed by the law chosen by the application of the rules [of Chapter
6J.""' Since the transferor courts will not be bound by the rules of Chapter
6, but rather by "the laws normally applicable in those courts,""' 4 these claims
or issues may ultimately be governed by a different substantive law."
5
4. Dipefage
The repeated reference to "issues" in the two exceptions quoted above is
clear evidence that an issue-by-issue analysis, which is an integral feature of all
modern American choice-of-law methodologies, will also play a role in the
application of Chapter 6. " 6 Unlike all other methodologies, however, this
issue-by-issue consideration is authorized-not in the first-but in a later step of
the court's analysis." 7 The same will be true for cases that fall within another
escape clause, the one found in Subsection (d) of Section 6.01." ' In all these
cases, the issue-by-issue analysis may well lead to depefage, that is the
application of the law of different states to different issues in the same claim.
A more direct route to depefage may be provided by Sections 6.05 and 6.06.
Section 6.05, applicable to issues of monetary relief in tort and contract cases,
begins with the notion that these issues should, in principle, be governed by the
same law that governs the other tort or contract issues under Section 6.01 or
6.02-03, respectively, but then permits the application of a different law in some
circumstances." 9 Section 6.06, applicable to punitive damages in tort cases,
may also lead to the application of a different law to the issue of punitive
112. Id. §§ 6.01(e), 6.03(d).
113. Id. Section 6.01(e) refers to "the law chosen by the application of the rules in subsection
(c)." During the final discussion of the Proposed Final Draft, it was suggested that the phrase "rules
in subsection (e)" be changed to "previous rules" (i.e.. all rules of § 6.01). The Reporter agreed to
consider this suggestion. See Proceedings, supra note 15, at 54. Sections 6.02(b) and 6.03(d),
applicable to contracts, contain similar language.
114. Proposed Final Draft, supra note I. § 6.01(e).
115. But see id., Ch. 6, Intro. Note, cmt. c, at 390-91 (differentiating between cases in which
whole claims are remanded from cases in which only issues are remanded, and suggesting that in the
latter cases the rules of Chapter 6 should be followed, at least in spirit, by the transferor courts).
116. Id. at 388.
117. It seems, however, that an issue-by-issue consideration is also possible at an earlier point
in the court's analysis-that is the step that precedes the application of the choice-of-law rules of
Sections 6.01 and 6.03. In this step, the court weeds out false conflicts by examining whether, of
the involved states, there is "one state (that] has a policy that would be furthered by the application
of its law." Id. § 6.01(c). See infra text accompanying notes 122-124.
118. See infra text accompanying notes 155-160.
119. See infra text accompanying notes 161-166.
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damages than the law applicable to the other tort issues under Section 6.01 or
6.05.120
5. Structure: Steps of Analysis, Rules, and Escape Clauses
a. First Step: Preliminary Analysis
From a structural perspective, the approach of Chapter 6 can be divided into
four successive steps. In the first step, the transferee court conducts a
preliminary analysis for determining whether the case presents a conflict of laws.
Indeed, all sections of Chapter 6 become applicable only if "the parties assert the
application of laws that are in material conflict." 2 ' A contrario, if the parties
fail to raise the conflicts question or if the court determines that the asserted laws
are not in "material conflict," then the transferee court would not be bound by
the provisions of Chapter 6. The possibility that none of the parties to a
multistate tnass tort or mass contract dispute will raise the conflicts question is
indeed remote, but it does raise the intriguing question of which law should be
applied in such a case. Under current state practice, courts routinely decide such
cases under the law of the forum state as the residual law. The same is true for
diversity cases under Erie-Klaxon and in transfer cases under Van Dusen.
However, if Klaxon and Van Dusen are overruled, as contemplated by the
Proposed Final Draft, the transferee court will have no "forum law" to apply.
The resulting gap can be filled by a partial resurrection of either Klaxon or Van
Dusen or both, or by granting the transferee court the autonomy to choose the
applicable law. The latter option seems much more in tune with the Proposed
Final Draft's spirit. Arguably, the same gap and the same solutions are present
when the court determines that the asserted laws are not "in material conflict."
If this determination is accurate, then a decision by the transferee court to apply
any one of the asserted laws would be both sensible and totally non-controversial
and would not need to be grounded on a specific constitutional or legislative
basis.
b. Second Step: False Conflicts
In the second step of the analysis, the court is instructed to weed out false
conflicts. by determining whether, from among the contact states 2 whose law
120. See infra text accompanying notes 167-184.
121. See Proposed Final Draft. supra note 1, §§ 6.01(a), 6.02(a), 6.03(a). 6.06(a). Sections 6.04
and 6.05 also incorporate by reference the phrase quoted in the text hrough a cross-reference to
Sections 6.01-6.03.
122. In all cases, the contact states inclde the primary places of business or habitual residences
of the plaintiffs and defendants. In tort cases and those involving punitive damages, the relevant
contacts are the places of conduct and the resulting injury. In contract cases, the relevant contacts
are the places of contracting, performance, and location of subject matter of the contract. See id. §§
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has been asserted by the parties and found by the court to be in material
conflict,' there is "one state [that] has a policy that would be furthered by the
application of its law."' 24 If only one state is "interested" in applying its law,
the court is instructed to apply the law of that state.
c. Third Step: Resolving Non-False Conflicts Through Rules
In the third step, the court is left with cases in which "more than one state
has a policy that would be furthered by the application of its law."'2 In
interest-analysis terminology, these cases would include true conflicts, apparent
conflicts, and even some "unprovided-for" or no-interest cases. 26 Here the
court is provided with definite rules for resolving the conflict.'27 These rules
are discussed in Section II(B)(6) of this article.
d. Fourth Step: Escapes
Almost all of these rules, however, are subject to escapes which, when
applicable, authorize the application of a law other than that dictated by a strict
application of the rule. For example, the two escapes discussed earlier in
connection with the single-law objective2 ' apply to Sections 6.01 for torts, and
6.02 and 6.03 for contracts. Section 6.01 contains an additional and much more
prominent escape in Subsection (d). 2 9 Section 6.05(b), applicable to issues of
monetary relief, also contains a different escape that may lead to dipefage.'30
A less flexible escape is contained in Section 6.04, applicable to statutes of
6.01(b), 6.03(b), 6.06(b).
123. This qualification flows from the cross-reference to Subsection (a) that is contained in
Subsection (b) of Sections 6.01, 6.03, and 6.06. Id.
124. Id. §§ 6.01(c), 6.03(c), 6.06(c). The analysis whereby this determination is made is
described in Proposed Final Draft, supra note I. Ch. 6, Intro. Note, cmt. c, at 392-93, and is identical
to that followed in the first step of interest analysis or, for that matter, any other modem functional
analysis.
125. Id. §§ 6.01(c), 6.03(c).
126. The possibility that, in mass tort or mass contract cases. none of the involved states "has
a policy that would be furthered by the application of its law" is remote. This may be the reason for
which this possibility is not expressly addressed by the Proposed Final Draft. If such a situation does
arise, one must assume, as in the cases where the involved laws are not "in material conflict," that
the transferee court should have the power to independently choose the applicable law guided only
by the general principles of the Proposed Final Draft. See supra text following note 121. On the
other hand, at least in ton cases, the Proposed Final Draft does expressly address cases in which
some of the involved states have a policy that would be furthered while other states do not have such
a policy. In such cases the Proposed Final Draft instructs the court to choose "from among the laws
of the interested states." Proposed Final Draft. supra note I, § 6.01(c) (emphasis added).
127. See id. §§ 6.01(c)(I)-(4), 6.03(b)(l)-(4), 6.06(c).
128. See supra Section ll(B)(3)(b).
129. This escape is discussed inifra at text accompanying notes 155-160.
130. See supra Section ll(B)(4) and infra Section l(B)(7)(a).
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limitation.' Thus, the only section that does not contain an open escape is
Section 6.06, applicable to punitive damages. 3
2
6. Rules for Mass Torts
a. Rules 1-4
For mass torts, Section 6.01(c) provides four choice-of-law rules to be
employed in the third step of the analysis described above. These rules, are to
be applied in the order in which they are listed so that, if the case falls within
the scope of the first rule, that rule governs to the exclusion of the second rule,
and so forth. These rules call for the application of the law of:
(Rule i the state of conduct, if the injury is also in that state;' 3
[Rule 2] the state where all'34 plaintiffs and a defendant habitually
reside or have their primary place of business,' 35 with regard to claims
against that defendant,'36
[Rule 3] the state where all' 37 plaintiffs habitually reside or have their
primary places of business,3 8 if that state is also the place of inju-
ry;' 39 and
[Rule 4] the state where the injury-causing conduct occurred.'40
Section 6.01, in general, and the above four rules, in particular, were the
focus of discussion at both the 1992 and the 1993 meetings of the Institute
131. See infra text accompanying notes 206-221.
132. See infra text accompanying notes 167-184.
133. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, § 6.01(c)(1).
134. During the final discussion of the Draft on May 13, 1993. it was suggested that some
qualifying language, such as the word "substantially" be added before "all." The Reporter agreed
to consider this suggestion. See Proceedings, supra note 15, at 56.
135. Section 6.01(c)(2) also provides that plaintiffs located in states whose laws "are not in
material conflict" shall be treated as if residing or having their primary place of business in the same
state. For an analogous provision, see Louisiana Civil Code article 3544(1), applicable only to "loss
distribution" issues, which provides that "persons domiciled in states whose law on the particular
issue is substantially identical shall be treated as if domiciled in the same state." For a discussion
of the rationale of this provision as an easy way of disposing of some false conflicts, see Symeonides.
Exegesis, supra note 5, at 723-25. An identical provision is contained in the Project for the
Codification of Puerto Rican Private International Law, Article 47 (Academy Draft, 1991, Symeon
C. Symeonides & Arthur T. von Mehren, Reporters).
136. Proposed Final Draft, stpra note I, § 6.01(c)(2).
137. See supra note 134 regarding the possible addition of qualifying language.
138. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, § 6.01(c)(3). also provides that "[plaintiffs shall be
considered as sharing a common habitual residence or primary place of business if they are located
in states whose laws are not in material conflict."
139. Id. § 6.01(c)(3).
140. Id. § 6.01(c)(4). When the conduct occurred in more than one state, the court is directed
to choose "the conduct state that has the most significant relationship to the occurrence." Id.
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membership. During the 1992 meeting, this section was criticized, inter alia, by
prominent conflicts teachers such as Professors Russell Weintraub and Louise
Weinberg. Their motions to amend the section, however, were unsuccessful.
Weintraub's and Weinberg's views on the matter have been published else-
where.' 4 During the 1993 debate, the opposition was joined by two other
distinguished conflicts scholars, Professors Donald Trautman and Friedrich
Juenger. Their views are reproduced in this Symposium.'42 Most of the other
contributions to this Symposium also focus on Section 6.01. '43
In light of this plethora of critiques, as well as this author's duty of
neutrality as a symposium host, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to engage
in an extensive discussion of these rules here. Besides, after drafting choice.-of-
law rules for two different jurisdictions,'44 there is no easy way for this author
to avoid the appearance of having a narcissistic preference for his own rules."' 5
Be that as it may, it is this author's opinion that: Rule I makes perfect
sense if the issue in question is one of conduct regulation, as opposed to one of
loss-distribution; 4 6 Rule 2 makes perfect sense if the issue in question is one
of loss distribution;' 47 Rule 3 makes perfect sense if the plaintiffs' state
141. See Russell J. Weintraub, Aln Approach to Chuice of Law that Focuses on Consequences,
56 Alb. L. Rev. 701 (1993); Weinberg. Yupra note 9; Louise Weinberg, Choosing Law: The
Limitations Debates. 1991 U. Ill. L. Rev. 683, 710-11, 716-17 (1991). Professor Weinberg also
participated in the 1993 meeting. Her motion to amend § 6.01, which was supported by this author,
was narrowly defeated. See Proceedings, supra note 15, at 41-52.
142. For Professor Trautman, see Trautman. supra note 77. For Professor Juenger. see Juenger
supra note 51 and Juenger, supra note 9.
143. See Kozyris, supra note 51; Nafziger. supra note 51; Sedler supra note 51, Seidelson, supra
note 51; Shreve. supra note 51.
144. See supra note 5 for the Louisiana codification, and supra note 135 for the Puerto Rico
codification.
145. This author does not admit to a general bias in favor of his own rules. Indeed, he
recognizes that drafting state choice-of-law rules, designed primarily for regular torts, is a much
easier undertaking than drafting rules for mass tons.
146. For the meaning, origin, and rationale of this distinction, see Symeon C. Symeonides,
Problems and Dilemmas in Codifying Choice of Law for Torts: The Louisiana Experience in
Comparative Perspective, 38 Am. J. Comp. L. 431, 441-44 (1990). The Proposed Final Draft does
not directly subscribe to this distinction. But see Proposed Final Draft, supra note I, § 6.05
discussed infra at text accompanying notes 161-166. Louisiana Civil Code article 3543 contains a
rule which is similar to Rule I of § 6.0l(c)(1) but which, unlike Rule 1, is confined to "[ilssues
pertaining to standards of conduct and safety." For the rationale and operation of this rule. see
Symeonides, Exegesis, supra note 5. at 705-08. Moreover, Louisiana Civil Code article 3543
authorizes the application of the law of the state of conduct even if the injury occurred in another
state, if the law of the latter state provides for a standard that is the same as, or lower than, that of
the state of conduct. This sub-rule is another quick way of identifying and disposing of false
conflicts. See Symeonides, Exegesis, supra note 5, at 705-08. On the other hand, Article 3544,
which applies only to "lilssues pertaining to loss distribution," authorizes the application of the law
of the state of conduct and injury but only if that state is also the domicile of either the tortfeasor or
the victim.
147. Louisiana Civil Code article 3544(1), applicable to issues of loss distribution, calls for the
application of the law of the common domicile of the tortfeasor and the victim. For the rationale of
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provides for a higher standard than that of either the defendant's state or the
conduct state; *48 and Rule 4 makes perfect sense if the issue in question is one
of regulation of conduct and the state of conduct imposes a higher standard of
conduct than that of the other involved states.' 9
The above qualifications may appear incompatible with the letter of Section
6.01, especially because the four rules provided in Subsection (c): (I) are not
phrased in terms of particular issues; (2) do not adopt the distinction between
conduct regulation and loss distribution; and (3) do not make the selection of the
applicable law dependent on its content.5 Nevertheless, on closer analysis, a
different picture emerges. For example, as stated earlier, although the four choice-
of-law rules of Section 6.01 are not phrased in terms of issues, an issue-by-issue
analysis is called for by other provisions of Section 6.01 whose application either
precedes'' or follows the application of these rules.' 2 Similarly, although the
above rules do not adopt the distinction between issues of conduct regulation and
issues of loss distribution, such a distinction is possible under other provisions of
Section 6.01 whose application precedes or follows the application of these
rules.'"3 More importantly, this distinction is almost explicit given that Chapter
6 provides separate rules for compensatory damages (Section 6.05) and punitive
damages (Section 6.06).'5' Moreover, although the above rules do not expressly
authorize consideration of the content of, and standards provided by, the competing
this rule, see Symeonides, Elregesis. supra note 5, at 715-25.
148. These cases present true conflicts. The higher standard of the state of injury reflects an
interest in protecting victims domiciled therein. The lower standard of the defendant's state or the
conduct state reflects an interest in protecting defendants domiciled in or acting within its borders.
Although reasonable people may disagree as to how these conflicts should be resolved, the
application of the law of the place of injury is justified if the defendant should have foreseen that the
injury would occur in the plaintiff's domicile. This is the solution adopted by the Louisiana Civil
Code. See Louisiana Civil Code article 3543 for issues of conduct regulation and Article 3544(2)(b)
for issues of loss distribution. For the rationale of these rules, see Symeonides. E'egesis, supra note
5. at 710-12. 729-31. On the other hand. when the state of injury provides for a lower standard, that
state has no real interest in applying its law to benefit the foreign defendant at the expense of its own
domiciliaries. At least when the issue in question is one of conduct regulation, the state where the
defendant acted or had his domicile would have an interest in applying its law to regulate conduct
by its own or foreign domiciliaries acting within its borders. See La. Civ. Code art. 3543 and
Symeonides, Exegesis. supra note 5. at 709-10.
149. See supra note 148. Without this qualification, Rule 4 has the potential of providing a
haven for major mass tortfeasors. For a critique on this point, see Juenger, supra note 51. at 919;
Weinberg, supra note 9. at 846-51; Weintraub, supra note 141, at 723.
150. One of the major premises of Chapter 6 is that "federal choice of law rules should not be
designed with the objective of promoting substantive preferences for one party rather than the other."
Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, Ch. 6, Intro. Note, cmt. c, at 387.
151. For the issue-by-issue analysis permitted by the first section of Subsection (c) of § 6.01,
see supra note 117.
152. See discussion of Subsection (e) of § 6.01, supra at text accompanying notes 110-115 and
Subsection (d) of § 6.01, infra at text accompanying notes 155-160.
153. See supra notes 151-152.
154. See discussion of § 6.05(b), infra at text accompanying notes 164-165.
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state laws, such consideration is -implicitly authorized by other provisions of
Section 6.01, whose application either precedes or follows the application of these
rules.'55 In conclusion, therefore, it might be said that most of the objections to
the above four rules of Section 6.01 are capable of being addressed through devices
made available by other provisions of Chapter 6, not the least of which is the escape
clause of Section 6.01(d).
b. The Escape of Subsection (d)
Subsection (d) of Section 6.01 provides a broad, open-ended escape from any
and all of the above four rules of Section 6.01. As evidenced by this clause's
extensive history, the Institute strove to attain an appropriate balance between the
competing goals of certainty and flexibility." 6 In Tentative Draft No. 3, the
opening phrase of Subsection (d) provided that "to ensure that the results obtained
by the application of the rules set out in the preceding subsections are in the
interests of justice and not arbitrary, the transferee court may . . . ."s' During the
discussion of that draft in May 1992, the Institute decided that this clause had the
potential of seriously undermining the Project's goal of certainty and predictability
by giving too much discretion to the transferee court. The opening clause of
Subsection (d) was therefore rephrased to provide:
(d) When necessary to avoid unfair surprise or arbitrary results, the
transferee court may choose the applicable law on the basis of additional
factors that reflect the regulatory policies and legitimate interests of a
particular state not otherwise identified under subsection (b), or it may
depart from the order of preferences for selecting the governing law
prescribed by subsection (c).15 8
During the final consideration of the Proposed Final Draft by the Institute's
membership on May 13, 1993, Subsection (d) was again the object of specific
155. See supra notes 151-152.
156. For the perpetual tension between certainty and flexibility in American conflicts law, see
Symeonides. Exception Clauses, supra note 84.
157. American Law Institute, Complex Litigation Project, Tentative Draft No. 3 (March 31.
1992) [hereinafter Tentative Draft No. 31. The balance of Subsection (d) was the same as in the
Proposed Final Draft. See infra at text accompanying note 158.
158. Proposed Final Draft, supra note I, § 6.01(d) (emphasis added). For a similar story, see
Louisiana Civil Code article 3547, which provides in part that "tt]he law applicable under Articles
3543-46 shall not apply if, from the totality of the circumstances of an exceptional case, it is clearly
evident under the principles of Article 3542, that the policies of another state would be more
seriously impaired if its law were not applied to the particular issue" (emphasis added). The
italicized words were added by the Council of the Louisiana State Law Institute in order to restrain
the applicability of this exception. For the history and meaning of this exception, see Symeonides.
Exegesis, supra note 5. at 763-66. For a critique. see Russell J. Weintraub, The Contributions of
Symeonides and Kozyris to Making Choice of Law Predictable and Just: An Appreciation and
Critique. 38 Am. J. Comp. L. 511 (1990).
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discussion; however, this time most members favored granting the transferee court
more discretion. Expressing this sentiment, Mr. Bennet Boskey proposed, and the
Reporter agreed, to replace the italicized word "necessary" with the word
"appropriate.' 9 Later, Judge Beasley proposed that the entire Subsection (d) be
replaced with the following language: "(d) To avoid unfair surprise or arbitrary
results, the transferee court may, in its discretion choose the applicable law.'
The Reporter agreed to consider this language.' 6' Since the Final Draft is not yet
available, it is not known how the final version of Subsection (d) will read.
Consequently, any specific discussion of it would be premature.
7. Damages
a. Compensatory Damages
Section 6.05 provides that issues of "monetary relief,"' 162 other than
punitive damages, in both tort and contract cases are to be determined in
accordance with the same law or laws that govern the tort or contract under
Sections 6.01-6.03 of the Proposed Final Draft. This rule is in keeping with the
otherwise laudable single-law objective which underlies the entire Project. The
drafters recognize, however, that in some instances, this objective may be
unattainable or undesirable. For example, the drafters observe:
[I]n some instances decisions regarding what damages are recoverable
may reflect policy determinations involving how to allocate losses
between parties, rather than the conduct-regulating policies that underlie
the liability rules being applied. In that event, simply to apply the same
choice of law rules to both issues inappropriately may ignore these
distinctions.
63
This is an express recognition of the distinction between issues of conduct
regulation and loss distribution which is drawn from the American conflicts
experience and which also forms the basis of the. 1992 Louisiana conflicts
codification." The drafters of Chapter 6 put this experience to good use.
Subsection (b) of Section 6.05 authorizes the court to sever issues of monetary
relief, if it determines that these issues "involve policies different from those
underlying the liability issues and that the application of the law or laws selected
under §§ 6.01-6.03 to those issues would ignore the interests of states whose
policies regarding the measure of relief would be furthered by the application of
159. See Proceedings, supra note 15, at 36; also reprinted in Trautman, supra note 77, at 835.
160. See Proceedings, supra note 15, at 39.
161. Id. For objections by Professor Roger Cramton, see id. at 56. See also id. at 58.
162. This term is designed to ensure that Section 6.05 applies to reslitutionary. as well as
damage, remedies. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note I, § 6.05, cmt. b, at 494.
163. Id. at 495.
164. See supra note 135 and text accompanying notes 146-155.
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their laws." In such a case, the court is authorized to apply the law of the latter
states.' 65 Thus, issue-by-issue analysis and dipefage are eventually brought
in through the side door and become available as tools for correcting the
potential rigidity of the rules found in Section 6.01.
b. Punitive damages
Section 6.06 applies to punitive damages in tort cases. Like the correspond-
ing article of the Louisiana Civil Code,'"6 this section revolves around three
factual contacts: the place or places of the injury; the conduct that caused the
injury; and the primary places of business or habitual residences of the
defendants. 67 Conspicuously, and appropriately, absent from the list is the
victims' residence.'" The court's choice is confined to these three states. 69
Clause one of Subsection (c) of Section 6.06 addresses false-conflict cases. It
provides that, if the court finds that only one of the three states has a policy that
would be furthered by the application of its law, that law applies, regardless of
whether it allows punitive damages.170
i. The Basic Rule
Clause two of Subsection (c) enunciates the basic rule for non-false conflicts,
that is, cases in which more than one of the above states "[have] polic[ies] that
would be furthered by the application of [their] law."'' The rule authorizes
the court to award punitive damages "if the laws of the states where any two of
the [above] factors ... are located authorize their recovery.' ' 72 This phrasing
is unnecessarily, and perhaps inadvertently, confining. Taken literally, this
phrasing means that for punitive damages to be awarded under this rule, the state
under whose law they are awarcqed must have two of the above listed factual
165. Proposed Final Draft, sispra note I. § 6.05, cmt. b, at 495.
166. See La. Civ. Code an. 3546. For discussion, see Symeonides. Exegesis, supra note 5, at
735-49.
167. Proposed Final Draft. supra note I. § 6.06(b).
168. Since punitive damages are designed to regulate conduct rather than compensate victims,
the domicile of the victim is irrelevant. See id. § 6.06, cmt. a, at 501: Symeonides. Exegesis. sispra
note 5. at 736-37.
169. See Proposed Final Draft. stupra note I. § 6.06, cmt. b. at 510 ("If it is determined that only
one of those states has a policy that would be furthered .... " (emphasis added)).
170. Id. § 6.06(c). first clause.
171. Id. § 6.06(c), second clause.
172. Id. § 6.06(c), second sentence. This rule is conditioned on a finding that "the possible
imposition of punitive damages reasonably was foreseeable to the defendants." Id. Section 6.06(d)
provides that, in the event that these states differ with respect to the standard of conduct for which
punitive damages may be awarded, the standard of proof required, or the amount or method of
calculation of such damages, "the order of preference for the governing law on those issues, among
the states authorizing punitive damages, is the place of conduct, the primary place of business or
habitual residence of the defendant, and the place of injury."
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contacts; that is, it must be the state of both (a) the conduct and the injury; or
(b) the conduct and the defendant's primary place of business or residence; or
(c) the injury and the defendant's primary place of business or residence. Under
this literal reading, punitive damages would not be available if, for example, the
conduct, the injury, and the defendant's primary place of business are in different
states, even if all three of those states impose punitive damages. To disallow
punitive damages in such a manifest false conflict would clearly be incompatible
with the spirit of Section 6.01. This is why such a literal reading should be
avoided. Thus, the basic rule of clause two of Section 6.06(c) should be read as
authorizing the award of punitive damages when such damages are available
either under the law of a state that has at least two of the above contacts, or
under the laws of two different states each of which has at least one of the above
contacts. 1
73
The above rule is followed by two clauses addressing situations in which the
conduct or the injury occurred in more than one state. 174 A third possibility,
if the defendant's business is located in more than one state, is very sensibly
addressed by the comments: "[Tihe determination of [such a defendant's)
primary place of business will depend on locating the place of business that is
most closely related to the conduct for which punitive damages are sought."',75
This determination is properly left to the court and is to be made on an ad hoc
basis.
ii. Multiple Places of Conduct
Clause four of Section 6.06(c) addresses situations in which the conduct
occurred in more than one state and instructs the court to "choose the law of the
conduct state that has the most significant relationship to the occurrence."'
716
The italicized words may cause some confusion. If read literally, they may lead
to the conclusion that, when the conduct occurred in more than one state, the
court must apply the law of the conduct state that has the most significant
relationship to the-occurrence, regardless of whether the other two contact states
(the state of injury and the defendant's state) allow such damages.
Such a reading should be avoided. Instead, clause four should be read, not
as an independent choice-of-law rule, but rather as an interpretative sub-rule for
aiding the court in applying the choice-of-law rule of clause two, or for
identifying false conflicts under clause one of Subsection (c). This means that:
(1) in cases in which punitive damages are otherwise available under the rule of
173. This reading is supported by the Reporter's comment. See id. § 6.06, cmt. b, at 510 ("If
any tvo of the states identified under subsection (b) authorize punitive damages .... " (emphasis
added)). This is also the rule provided by Louisiana Civil Code article 3546. See, Symconides,
Exegesis, supra note 5. at 737-41.
174. Proposed Final Draft, supra note I, § 6.06(c), fourth and third sentences, respectively.
175. Id. § 6.06, cmt. b, at 509-10.
176. Id. § 6.06(c), fourth sentence (emphasis added).
1994]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
clause two without regard to the law of the state of conduct (e.g., when such
damages are provided by the law of the state of injury and the defendant's state),
then clause four will be inoperative; (2) when, under the rule of clause two, the
award of punitive damages depends in part on whether such damages are
available under the law of the state of conduct (e.g., because one of the other
two contact states does not allow punitive damages), then the interpretative
clause four is applicable. In such a case, the clause should be interpreted as
meaning that, if the conduct is in more than one state, the court must identify or
determine the conduct state that has the most significant relationship to the
occurrence. As in the case when the defendant has multiple places of busi-
ness,177 this determination will not necessarily mean that the law of this state
will apply. , It simply means that this state will serve as "the conduct state" for
purposes of applying the choice-of-law rule of clause two. If this state allows
punitive damages and it is also the state in which either the injury occurred or
the defendant's primary place of business or habitual residence is located, then
punitive damages will be available under the rule of clause two.77
iii. Multiple Places of Injury
Clause three of Subsection (c) is more problematic. It provides that "[i]f
multiple places of injury are involved and they differ as to the availability of
punitive damages, the law of the state where the conduct causing the injury
occurred governs."' 79  Read. literally, this clause may defeat or authorize the
award of punitive damages in certain cases in which it should not.
In a multistate products liability action, for example, if the states where all
but one of the victims suffered their injury impose punitive damages and one
such state does not, then the above quoted clause applies and requires the
application of the law of the place of conduct. If that state does not allow
punitive damages, such damages will be denied these plaintiffs, even though such
damages are authorized by the defendant's state and by most of the states of
injury.8 ° Conversely, when all but one of the states where the victims suffered
177. See supra text accompanying note 175.
178. The same should be true if the places of primary conduct, injury, or defendant's business
or residence are in different states, but two of those states allow punitive damages. See supra text
accompanying notes 171-175.
179. Proposed Final Draft, supra note I, § 6.06(c), third sentence.
180. This reading is confirmed by the following Reporter's comment:
If there is more than one place of injury ... and those states differ as to whether punitive
damages can be awarded, they will be authorized under subsection (c) if the place of
conduct and the defendant's primary place of business or habitual residence authorize
punitive damages .... However, if the law of the place of defendant's conduct conflicts
with the law of the defendant's primary place of business, then, given the absence of a
single place of injury, no two factors under § 6.06(b) are alike in their treatment of
punitive recoveries. Under those circumstances, the law of the place of the injury-causing
conduct will determine the availability of punitive damages.
[Vol. 54
SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES
their injury deny punitive damages but one such state allows them, the
prescription that "the law of the state where the conduct causing the injury
occurred governs"'"' would allow the award of punitive damages if the conduct
state allows them, regardless of whether such damages are also authorized by the
law of the defendant's domicile. Fortunately, this inference is negated by a
statement in the comments,1s8 and this sentence will probably be redrafted so
as to make clear that the quoted clause will become applicable only when the
law of the state of conduct and the defendant's state disagree on the availability
of punitive damages. 83  However, the problem identified earlier of denying
punitive damages in the converse case will probably remain unresolved.
8. Mass Contracts
Sections 6.02 and 6.03 provide rules for mass contracts cases. Examples
mentioned by the comments include contract actions by consumers against the
manufacturer of a defective product distributed nationwide and disputes between
product manufacturers or polluters and their insurers.'84 In their contribution
to this Symposium, Messrs. Kalis, Sergendahl, and Waldron provide an in-depth
discussion of these sections, especially with regard to mass insurance contracts
covering environmental pollution. Significantly, these two sections apply to mass
contract cases "even if the underlying lawsuit is premised on tortious rather than
contractual, activity."'
85
a. Law Applicable in the Absence of Party-Choice-of-Law
Section 6.03 provides rules for selecting the law applicable to contracts that
do not contain a choice-of-law clause and for determining certain aspects of the
validity and effectiveness of such a clause. After ferreting out false con-
flicts,86 the court applies a single choice-of-law rule to resolve non-false
conflicts. The court is instructed to apply "the law of the state in which the
Id. § 6.06, cmt. b. at 510.
181. Id. § 6.06(c), third sentence.
182. See id. § 6.06. cmi. b. quoted supra note 180.
183. See Proceedings. supra note 15. at 2-3.
184. Proposed Final Draft. supra note I, § 6.02. cmt. a, at 444. See Peter J. Kalis et al., The
Choice-of-Law Dispute in Comprehensive Enironmental Coverage Litigation: Has Help Arrived
from the American Law Complex Litigation Project?, 54 La. L. Rev. 925 (1994).
185. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, at xxxvii (Reporters' Memorandum. Feb. 19, 1993).
186. See supra text accompanying notes 121-124. After the preliminary step of determining
whether the asserted state laws are "in material conflict." Proposed Final Draft, supra note I. §
6.03(a). the court is instructed to consider the law of the place or places of contracting, performance,
location of the subject matter of the contract, and the primary places of business or habitual
residences of the plaintiffs and defendants. Id. § 6.03(b). If the court finds that only one of the
above states is interested in having its law applied, the court is instructed to apply that law. Id. §
6.03(c).
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common contracting party has its primary place of business."'87 The Reporter
justifies this bold and almost unprecedented 8' rule by referring to the single-
law objective underlying the entire Chapter 6 and to the distinct probability that
the other three connecting factors employed by Section 6.03, the places of
contracting, performance and location of the subject matter of the contract will
be "distributed across many states." 9  The Reporter also addresses the
potential rigidity of this rule, though not its manipulability, by restating that the
determination of the primary place of business is left to the court-that it is to
be made on a case-by-case, contract-to-contract basis through an evaluation
focused on the particular activities that underlie the contracts in dispute, and
"will not necessarily result in an automatic reference to corporate headquar-
ters."
, 90
However, the best assurance that this rule will not become a euphemism for
applying the law favoring the common contracting party is the exception clause
that accompanies the rule. The exception authorizes the court to not apply the
law of the common contracting party if the court finds that this law "is in
material conflict with the regulatory objectives of the state law in the place of
performance or where the other contracting parties habitually reside."' 9'
Examples mentioned include consumer protective legislation in force at either or
both the place of performance or the consumers' residence.
Thus, despite the appearance of some rigidity, Section 6.03 vests the court
with considerable discretion in determining the law applicable to mass contracts.
187. Id. § 6.03(c).
188. The Reporter cites Article 4 of the EEC Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations (1980) [hereinafter EEC Conventionl as a precedent for such a rule. See Proposed Final
Draft, supra note I. § 6.03, Reporter's Note to cmt. a. at 465. Indeed, Article 4 calls for the
application of the law of the country with which the contract is "most closely connected." EEC
Convention, art. 4(l). This country is "presumed" to be one in which "the party who is to effect the
performance which is characteristic of the contract has, at the time of the conclusion of the contract,
his habitual residence, or .... its central administration ... [or with regard to contracts] entered into
in the course of that party's trade or profession, . . the country in which the principal place of
business is situated .... " Id. art. 4(2). However, as the Reporter recognizes, the quoted language
is a mere presumption rather than a rule. Furthermore, the presumption is explicitly made
inapplicable to certain contracts, such as contracts for the carriage of goods (id. an. 4(4)), contracts
involving immovables (id. art. 4(3)), consumer contracts (id. art. 5) (emphasis added), and
employment contracts (id. art. 6) or to certain issues such as capacity (id. art. II) and consent (id.
art. 8). Furthermore, even when the presumption does apply, it will not always lead to the law of
the primary place of business of the common contracting party. In that regard, the pertinent statutes
of Hungary and the former East Germany would more likely lead to this result. See The Statutes of
the Hungarian People's Republic, Law-Decree No. 13 of 1979 on Private International Law § 24 and
RechtsanwendLtngsgesetz [RAGI [Act concerning the law applicable to International, Private, Family
and Labor Law relationships as well as to international contracts] § 12, 1975 Gesetzblatt der DDR,
Teil I [GB ,II 748 (G.D.R.), translated in Friedrich K. Juenger, The Conflicts Statute of the German
Democratic Republic: An hItroduction and Translation, 25 Am. J. Comp. L. 332, 354-63 (1977).
189. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, § 6.03, cmt. a, at 461.
190. Id.
191. Id. § 6.03(c) (emphasis added).
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The court begins with a choice between the laws of the four contact states listed
in Subsection (b) and may dispose of some contract conflicts at this stage if it
determines that only one of those states has a policy that would be furthered by
the application of its law. For the remaining conflicts, the court may apply the
law of the common contracting party, unless the opposing parties demonstrate to
the court's satisfaction that the application of that law would impair the
"regulatory objectives" of either the state of performance or the state where the
other contracting parties reside. In such a case, the court "shall apply those state
laws to the contracts legitimately within their scope."'' Thus, under the rule
and its exception, it is conceivable that the law of the common contracting party
may apply to some contracts, the law of the residence of the other parties to
other contracts, and the law of the place of performance to other contracts.
93
b. Party Autonomy and its Limits
i. Preliminary Questions
When the parties have chosen the applicable law, Section 6.02 defines the
validity and limits of the parties' choice. Choice-of-law clauses are in principle
recognized in all western legal systems and have become common practice in most
multistate and international contracts." The systems differ only on the question
of how to decide the validity of such clauses and how to delineate the limits to party
autonomy.
Section 6.02 provides that, in cases where the laws of more than one state are
in material conflict, "the rights, liabilities, and defenses of the parties with respect
to a contract claim shall be governed by the law designated by the parties in the
contract . . . ."1' Although the comments do not address questions such as the
scope, form, and timing of the parties' choice, most of these questions can be
answered through inferences from the quoted text. For example, the word
"designated" implies that the Proposed Final Draft recognizes only express choice-
of-law clauses, as opposed to implied or, especially, imputed or hypothetical ones.
The words "in the contract" may mean that the choice-of-law clause must be
contained in the contract, rather than be derived from the conduct of the parties.
192. Id.
193. A fourth possibility is the application of the law of the state of the location of the subject
matter of the contract, with regard to a contract for which the court determines that only that state
"has a policy that would be furthered by the application of its law." Id. § 6.03(c), first sentence. All
these possibilities exist with regard to cases kept by the transferee court. Additional possibilities exist
if the court exercises the power accorded by Section 6.03(d) of subdividing the actions "into sub-
groups of claims, issues, or parties" and either keeping all of them or remanding some of them to
the transferor courts.
194. For recent American interstate practice, see Kozyris & Symeonides, supra note 63, at 618-
21; Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts it 1988, 37 Am. J. Comp. L.
457, 478-80 (1989).
195. Proposed Final Draft, stlpra note I, § 6.02(a).
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The words "a contract claim" suggests that the scope of a choice-of-law clause is
confined to contract claims and does not, for example, extend to tort claims.
ii. Existence and Validity of the Choice-of-Law Clause
Which law determines the existence and validity of the choice-of-law clause
is a preliminary question confronted by all codifiers. The three options are: the law
chosen by the parties;'% the law that would apply in the absence of choice of law
by the parties; 97 and, for some issues, the law of the forum qua forum.'9
Since the last choice is unavailable to transferee federal courts under the Project,
its drafters had to choose between the first two options. Referring these questions
to the chosen law would create some obvious problems of "bootstrapping" if, for
example, the chosen law gives the parties powers not granted them by the otherwise
applicable law. Referring these question to the otherwise applicable law avoids
these problems but undercuts much of the efficiency and convenience that make
choice-of-law clauses attractive to courts and litigants.
Section 6.02 strikes a middle, or perhaps mid-right, course by expressly
assigning certain "serious" questions of the clause's validity to the otherwise
applicable law and impliedly relegating the rest to the chosen law. Paragraph (I)
of Subsection (a) of Section 6.02 authorizes the court not to apply the chosen law,
if the court finds that the choice-of-law clause is invalid "for reasons of misrepre-
sentation, duress, undue influence or mistake, as defined under the state law that
otherwise would be applicable under § 6.03 .... '"9 On the other hand, by clear
implication, other questions of validity of the choice-of-law clause, such as
questions of incapacity or lack of proper form, and all questions pertaining to the
existence of the clause (i.e., offer and acceptance, meeting of the minds, etc.) are
relegated to the chosen law. 2°° The "bootstrapping" problems resulting from such
relegation can be controlled through Paragraph (2) of the same subsection which
defines the limits to party autonomy.
196. See, e.g., Swiss Federal Statute on Private International Law of December 18, 1987. art.
116(2), translated by Jean-Claude Comu et al., in Symeon C. Symeonides, Swiss Federal Statute on
Private lntenttional Law, 37 Am. J. Comp. L. 187, 193-246 (1989) which provides in part that "the
choice of law is governed by the chosen law."
197. See, e.g., La Civ. Code arts. 3537-3540 and Reporter's comments thereunder; EEC
Convention, supra note 188, art. 3(4).
198. See, e.g., Project for the Codification of Puerto Rican Private International Law. arts. 34-35,
supra note 135, and Reporter's comments thereunder. These articles provide that, in contracts other
than consumer, employment, or insurance contracts, the law chosen by the parties is to be applied
unless its application exceeds the limits imposed on party autonomy by both the law of the forum
and the otherwise applicable law.
199. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1. § 6.02(a)(1). During the final discussion of the draft,
the Reporter agreed to consider whether "unconscionability" should be added to the list of grounds
for invalidating a choice-of-law clause. See Proceedings, supra note IS, at 60-61. This factor was
included in earlier drafts.
200. This implication is confirmed by the Reporter's Notes. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note
1, § 6.02, Reporter's Note 8 to cmt. b, at 452.
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iii. Limits to Party Autonomy
The limits of party autonomy are also defined by reference to the otherwise
applicable law and are deliberately set at a rather high threshold. Section 6.02(a)(2)
provides that the law chosen by the parties shall not apply if it is found to be "in
material conflict with thefundamental regulatory objectives of the state law that
otherwise would be applicable under § 6.03."2'1 This language, especially the
word "fundamental," parallels the corresponding language of Section 187(2)(b) of
the Restatement Second and is intended to have the same general meaning," 2
despite the fact that, unlike Section 6.02, the Restatement seems to pose a double
hurdle before invalidating a choice-of-law clause. The two hurdles are, first, a
showing that the chosen law is "contrary to a fundamental policy"20 3 of the state
of the otherwise applicable law, and, second, a showing that the former state has a
"materially greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the
particular issue."n' However, it is questionable whether this difference in
verbiage will produce a difference in results. Indeed, perhaps because the Project's
scope is confined to mass contracts, the Proposed Final Draft seems to adopt a more
deferential position towards party autonomy than the Restatement. For example,
under the Restatement, a choice-of-law clause may be disregarded, even when it
does not contravene the fundamental policy of the otherwise applicable law, if the
chosen state "has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction and
there is no other reasonable basis for the parties' choice .... "20' The Project
imposes no such limitation.
9. Statutes of Limitations
a. The Choices
Under current practice, 2°6 a state court confronted with a limitations
conflict can choose from among three distinct approaches: (I) the traditional
common-law approach, also adopted by the original Restatement, which
characterizes limitations questions as procedural and assigns them to the
201. Id. § 6.02(a)(2) (emphasis added).
202. See id. § 6.02. cmt. b, at 450.
203. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187(2)(b) (1971).
204. Id.
205. Id. § 187(2)(a). This provision applies only with regard to issues "which the parties could
not have resolved by an explicit provision." Id. § 187(2). Regarding issues that are within the
contractual power of the parties, the Restatement imposes no limitations whatsoever. The Proposed
Final Draft does not make such a differentiation.
206. For recent discussions of past and present American practice, see Eugene Scoles & Peter
Hay. Conflict of Laws 58-67 (2d ed. 1992); Russell J. Weintraub. Commentary on the Conflict of
Laws 56-66 (3d ed. 1986): Margaret R. Grossman, Statutes of Limitations and the Conflict of Laws:
Modens Analysis, 1980 Ariz. St. L.J. I; Kozyris & Symeonides,. supra note 63, at 630-36;
Symeonides. supra note 194. at 474-78 (1989); Weinberg. supra note 141.
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exclusive domain of the law of the forum; °7 (2) the approach of the 1982
Uniform Conflict of Laws-Limitations Act, 0 8 which characterizes limitations
as substantive and, subject to some exceptions, refers them to the same law as
the one that governs the merits of the action;2 or (3) the modern or direct
approach, adopted by a minority of recent cases, which rejects both a priori
characterizations and calls for an independent analysis of the limitations
issue.2"0 Several combinations are also possible. For example, Section 142 of
the Restatement Second as revised in 19882 and Article 8 of the Puerto Rican
Draft Code 2 follow a combination of the third and first approaches, while
Article 3549 of the Louisiana Civil Code follows a combination of the second
and first approaches.2 On the other hand, under Klaxon and Guaranty,"4
a federal court sitting in diversity does not have any of the above choices but is
rather bound to follow the approach adopted by the courts of the forum state.
In transfer cases, that choice is also binding on the transferee court under
Feren.225
The first dilemma of the Proposed Final Draft's drafters was whether to
maintain the status quo by binding the transferee court to the limitations
207. See, e.g.. Restatement of Conflict of Laws §§ 585. 603 (1934). For statutory and judicial
exceptions see Symeon C. Symeonides, Louisiana Conflicts Law: Two "Surprises," 54 La. L. Rev.
497. 532 (1994) and authorities cited therein.
208. See Uniform Conflict of Laws-Limitations Act. 12 U.L.A. 63 (1982). This Act has been
adopted by Arkansas, Colorado, Montana. North Dakota, Oregon. and Washington. For an
authoritative discussion, see Robert A. Leflar. The New Contficts.Litnitations Act, 35 Mercer L. Rev.
461 (1984).
209. Uniform Conflict of Laws-Limitations Act section 2, 12 U.L.A. 63 (1982), authorizes the
application of the limitations law of the state on whose law is "substantively based." However, if
that law "is substantially different from the limitation period of [the forum] state and has not afforded
a fair opportunity to sue upon, or imposes an unfair burden in defending against the claim," Section
4 authorizes the application of the limitations law of the forum state. Id. § 4, at 64. Although not
directly influenced by the civil law, the new Act accidentally reflects the civilian approach which
considers prescription as merely a mode of extinguishing the obligation and subjects it to the same
law as the one applicable to the merits of the obligation or action. See Symeonides, supra note 207.
at n.157.
210. See Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 305 A.2d 412 (N.J. 1973). See also Nelson v. International
Paint Co.. 716 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1983); Tomlin v. Boeing Co., 650 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1981);
Schum v. Bailey. 578 F.2d 493 (3d Cir. 1978); Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc.,
206 N.W.2d 414 (Wis. 1973).
211. New § 142 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1988) instructs the court to
select the law applicable to limitations through the flexible and nuanced formula provided by Section
6 of the Restatement. This formula is detached from any a priori preference for either the lexfori
or the lex causae. However, this formula is implemented through presumptive rules that are based
on the lexfori as the basic rule. For discussion, see Symeonides, supra note 207. at 536 Weinberg,
supra note 141. at 705-710.
212. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Revising Puerto Rico's Conflicts Law: A Preview, 28 Colum.
J. Transnat'l L. 413, 433-47 (1990).
213. Louisiana Civil Code article 3549 is discussed in Symeonides, supra note 207. at 539-49.
214. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 65 S. Ct. 1464 (1945).
215. Ferens. v. John Deere Co.. 494 U.S. 516, 110 S. Ct. 1274 (1990).
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approach followed by the state of the transferor court or to liberate the transferee
court by providing an independent approach. In Tentative Draft Number 3, the
drafters proposed to maintain the status quo. Section 6.04 of that Draft
instructed the transferee court to "apply the limitations law that would be applied
by the court in which the claim was filed. 226 During the November 1992
meeting of the Consultative Group it was decided that the transferee court should
be freed from the shackles of the transferor court and be allowed to choose
independently the applicable limitations law by employing either the second or
the third approach described above. The Consultative Group recognized that
although conceptually appealing, this solution might be politically unwise; it
could deprive plaintiffs of the advantage currently enjoyed under Klaxon-Ferens
of shopping for the most favorable limitations law. A compromise was therefore
thought necessary. Section 6.04 of the Proposed Final Draft reflects that
compromise.
b. The Rule
Section 6.04 adopts the substantive law approach to limitations conflicts by
authorizing the application of the limitations law of the state whose law is
applicable to the merits of the tort or contract action under Sections 6.01-6.03 of
the Proposed Final Draft. This rule is entirely consistent with the Project's
single-law objective and its general disfavor of dpe~age. Also, there is
something inherently attractive, at least from a conceptual perspective, to the
idea, which has always been followed in civil law systems, that the law that
determines whether an obligation has come into existence should also determine
how long such an obligation will live.
In-practice, however, the inexorable application of that law to both issues
may lead to undesirable results in cases in which the law that governs the
obligation is chosen on the basis of grounds that do not allow consideration of
the special policies underlying the conflicting limitations laws. For example,
Section 6.01(c)(4) requires the application of the law of the place of conduct to
the liability issue without regard to any factors affiliated with the plaintiff. The
Reporter recognizes that in such a case, the law of the plaintiff's state may have
a better claim to apply its limitations law, at least with regard to issues such as
the discovery rule or other tollings of the statute of limitations." 7 To enable
the court to address such potential problems, the Reporter points out two helpful
mechanisms: (I) the savings clause of Section 6.04 which allows the court to
remand to the transferor court claims that were timely there but untimely under
the law applicable through Section 6.04; and (2) Section 6.01(e) which allows
the transferee court to "divide the actions into subgroups of claims, issues or
216. Tentative Draft No. 3. supra note 157, § 6.04.
217. See Proposed Final Draft. supra note I, § 6.04, cml. b, at 485.
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parties ... and allow more than one state's law to be applied." ' 8 In that
event, says the Reporter, "the transferee court appropriately may decide that
limitations questions should be separated from liability and be governed by the
law of the plaintiffs' domiciles.""1 9 In reaching this decision, the court will not
be directly bound by any of the rules of either Section 6.01 or Section 6.04.
Instead the court should conduct an independent analysis of the limitations issue,
an analysis that would not be different from the one prescribed by Section 142
of the Restatement Second.
c. The Savings Clause
The rule of Section 6.04 is accompanied by an exception or savings clause
that authorizes the transferee court to remand to the transferor court "any claim
that was timely where filed" but is barred by the limitations law selected through
the rule of Section 6.04.220 The combined effect of the rule and the exception
is that the plaintiff cannot lose on the issue of limitations. If her action is timely
under the law applicable through the rule, the action will be allowed to go
forward. If the action is not timely under that law, then the action will be
remanded to the transferor court. However, as the Reporter explains, there are
some very good reasons for this result, not the least of which is the need to
avoid unfair surprise to plaintiffs who may be drawn into the consolidated
proceeding in a remote forum against their wishes or contrary to their expecta-
tions.22 Insofar as defendants, as a class, can expect more benefits-some of
them deserved and others unintentional-from the application of the Proposed
Final Draft than plaintiffs, this concession to plaintiffs may provide a certain
degree of balance and even-handedness. Even with this concession, however,
plaintiffs will enjoy fewer advantages than under present law, which allows
plaintiffs both the advantage of the favorable limitations law of the transferor
court and the convenience of litigating in a transferee forum closer to home. 222
III. IN LIEU OF CONCLUSIONS
In 1991, while she was embarking on this arduous Project, Dean Mary Kay
Kane, the Reporter for Chapter 6, said the following to a conference of teachers
of conflicts and civil procedure:
[lI]dentifying and analyzing the issues in controversy and the debate that
centers on those issues may be of more lasting importance than any
218. Id. 6 6.01(e).
219. Id. § 6.04. cmi. b, at 485.
220. Id. § 6.04.
221. See id. § 6.04, cmt. a, at 473.
222. See Van Duscn v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 84 S. Ct. 805 (1964); Ferens v. John Deere Co.,
494 U.S. 516, I10 S. Ci. 1274 (1990).
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particular solution; no choice of law solution will accommodate
everyone's concerns. Only if we are able to organize the core issues
that need to be addressed in any choice of law proposal will there be
the possibility of slowly working toward a consensus on these mat-
ters .... 223
As the contributions to this Symposium demonstrate, the now-completed
Proposed Final Draft does not accommodate everyone's concerns. Indeed, it
would be suspect if it did. However, the Project as a whole has done more than
promote an understanding of the issues addressed by it; it has dared to shake the
stagnant waters with thoughtful, bold, and imaginative proposals that are bound
to generate a lively debate. Consensus may be late in coming, but at least the
debate will now be focused and is more likely to be productive. Congress would
do well to give this Project a most serious consideration. Regardless of whether
it is adopted by Congress, in whole or in part, the Project is bound to have a
lasting and clearly beneficial influence on the handling of multistate complex
litigation.
223. Kane, Drafting Choice of Law Rides. supra note 12, at 31.1.
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